| Indhold: |
The nature, structure, function and reality of self have been discussed for millennia. In both ancient and modern times, the existence of self has been questioned. Frequently, the claim of the self-sceptics has been that the self, if it exists, must be some kind of unchanging and ontologically independent entity. Given that no such entity exists, there is no self. Thinkers more friendly disposed towards the self have frequently replied that the proposed definition of self is highly contestable, and that there are other more plausible definitions available.
During the course, we will study some of the most important classical phenomenological contributions to an analysis of self (by Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre and Henry), and then relate these proposals to a number of more recent contributions (by Strawson, Metzinger, Dennett, Dainton, Schechtman and Zahavi). We will consider the arguments put forth by the self-skeptics, but we will also discuss and assess the plausibility of two recently proposed accounts of self, namely the experiential and narrative accounts.
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| Litteratur: |
Gallagher, S. & Shear, S. (eds.). Models of the Self. Thorverton: Imprint Academic, 1999.
Gallagher, S. (ed.). The Oxford Handbook of the Self. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
Seigel, J. The idea of the self: Thought and experience in Western Europe since the seventeenth century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Siderits, M., Thompson, E., Zahavi, D. (eds.). Self, no self? Perspectives from Analytical, Phenomenological, and Indian Traditions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
Sorabji, R. Self: Ancient and modern insights about Individuality, Life and Death. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2008.
Thiel, U. The Early Modern Subject: Self-consciousness and personal identity from Descartes to Hume. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
Zahavi, D. Self-awareness and Alterity: A phenomenological Investigation. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1999.
Zahavi, D. Subjectivity and selfhood: Investigating the first-person perspective. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005.
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